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BOOK REVIEW
REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF
1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND
USING NEW EVIDENCE. By Wilfred J. Ritz. Edited by Wythe
Holt & L.H. LaRue. Norman, Oklahoma & London, England:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1990. Pp. 264.
Reviewed by Roger J. Miner*
The 102d Congress of the United States is in its second session as this
book review is written. The problems this Congress faces, difficult as they
are, pale into insignificance when compared with the tasks that confronted
the first Congress when it convened in 1789 under the newly ratified
Constitution. Although the Constitution contained the broad outlines of a
new national government, the members of the first Congress were
constrained to draw a more detailed blueprint for governance. That they
were able to do so in one session is a tribute to their sweeping visions of
the future as well as to their political abilities. Their consensus-forging
skills are worthy of study by modem-day lawmakers, who often seem
incapable of compromise. 1 There is much else to be learned from an
examination of the work of the first Congress, which set the stage for a
new government of the United States by fleshing out the Constitution in
the course of adopting twenty-seven separate acts and four resolutions. 2
One of the most enduring of the twenty-seven acts adopted by the first
Congress was the one entitled "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of
the United States." 3 Frequently referred to as the Judiciary Act of 1789,
or the First Judiciary Act, this item of legislation established a three-level
system of national courts that has continued, with various jurisdictional
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Adjunct Professor of
Law, New York Law School.
1. The National Legal Center for the Public Interest blames "the increased
politicization of the legislative process" for the inaction of the 101st and 102d Congresses,
noting that legislation bearing on "[n]early every major issue--from campaign reform to
unemployment insurance to employment discrimination to abortion to resale price
maintenance to crime--found its way into a veto showdown that slowed and, in some cases,
eliminated its prospects."

The Legislative Year in Review: What Happened? Wat Are the

Underlying Trends?, JUD. LEGIS. WATCH REP. (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest,
Wash., D.C.), Mar. 6, 1992, at 2, 2.
2. See WILFRED 3. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:
ExPosiNG MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 13 (Wythe Holt

& L.H. LaRue eds., 1990).
3. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1789].
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and functional alterations at each level, to the present day. 4 Exercising the
power granted to it under the Constitution to establish courts "inferior" to
the Supreme Court, the first Congress, in the First Judiciary Act,
established both district and circuit courts. 5 No judges were authorized for
the circuit courts, which were to be composed of two Supreme Court
Justices "riding circuit" plus a district judge.6 For district court purposes,
the nation was divided into thirteen districts, with at least one district in
each state.7 One judge was provided for each district court.' For circuit
court purposes, three circuits were established, each consisting of two or'
more districts.9
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, both the district and circuit courts
were courts of original jurisdiction, and the circuit courts had certain
appellate jurisdiction as well. Congress conferred upon the district courts
(1) exclusive jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty causes, including
seizures on the high seas (saving to suitors available common law
remedies); (2) exclusive jurisdiction over all seizures on land and over all
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United
States; (3)jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the several states and
the circuit courts, "of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States"; (4)
jurisdiction, concurrent with the state and circuit courts, in suits at
common law brought by the United States in which "the matter in dispute
amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars";
and (5) exclusive jurisdiction of suits against consuls or vice-consuls,
except for criminal offenses triable in the circuit courts. 10
The district courts were given exclusive criminal jurisdiction
respecting
crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority
of the United States, committed within their respective districts,
4. See generally PAUL M. BATOR Er AL, HART & WEcHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 30-49 (3d ed. 1988) (tracing the evolution of the
federal court system); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 1-8 (4th ed.
1983) (highlighting major events in the evolution of the federal judiciary); Roger J. Miner,
Planningfor the Second Century of the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals: The Report of the
Federal Courts Study Committee, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 673, 674-76 (1991) (discussing
the creation of modem circuit courts of appeals).
5. See Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. at 73-75.
6. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75.
7. Seeid. §2, 1 Sta. at73.
8. See id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 73-74.
9. See id. § 4, 1 Sta. at 74-75.
10. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76-77.
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or upon the high seas; where no other punishment than whipping,
not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is
to be inflicted.11
The circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction of the same crimes
and offenses, and exclusive jurisdiction over all others." On the civil
side, the Act accorded to the circuit courts
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are
plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State.13
The Act provided for removal of cases from state courts to the circuit
courts in private civil litigation when the amount in dispute exceeded five
hundred dollars and the petition for removal was filed by (1) a defendant
who was an alien; (2) a defendant sued in a state different from his state
of citizenship by a plaintiff who was a citizen of the state in which the suit
was brought; or (3) by a party claiming a grant of land title from a state
other than the forum state when the adverse party claimed title under a
grant from the forum state and both parties were citizens of the forum
state.1 The circuit courts had appellate jurisdiction over final decrees of
the district courts in admiralty and maritime cases in which the amount in
dispute exceeded three hundred dollars, and over final judgments of the
district courts in civil cases in which the amount in dispute exceeded fifty
dollars. 5 There was no right of appeal from any criminal conviction in
the federal court system until 1889, when the right of direct review by the
Supreme Court was provided for capital cases. 6 The First Judiciary Act
11. Id.
12. See id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 79.
13. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
14. See id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 79-80.
15. See id. §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. at 83-84.
16. See Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 656; see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387, 409 (1985) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting) ("[In 1889] Congress granted a right of direct
review in the Supreme Court in capital cases. In 1891 Congress extended this right to
include 'otherwise infamous' crimes.") (citations omitted).
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also failed to confer general federal question jurisdiction upon the lower
courts, a deficiency that was not finally remedied until 1875.17
Congress conferred upon the Supreme Court, in language tracking the
Constitution,"8 (1) exclusive jurisdiction over civil controversies in which
a state was a party, except suits between a state and its citizens; (2)
original and exclusive jurisdiction in suits against ambassadors or other
public ministers, consistent with the law of nations; and (3) original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors or other
public ministers. 9 Original but not exclusive jurisdiction was provided
in actions between a state and citizens of other states or aliens.2'
Manifesting the importance of jury trials to the American citizenry, the
Act provided that "the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all
actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury."'"
Final judgments and decrees of the circuit courts in civil cases were
appealable to the Supreme Court on writs of error when the matter in
dispute exceeded two thousand dollars in value.' Review of a final
judgment of the highest court of a state was allowed when the question
involved the validity of a treaty, a statute of the United States or an
authority exercised under the United States.'
The Judiciary Act of 1789 is more than just an object of historical
interest. It is an important point of reference for those who are concerned
with the present-day operation of the federal court system and who care
about its future. At a time when structural reform of the system is under
serious consideration,' the institutional antecedents of the existing
17. Federal question jurisdiction was conferred upon the district courts by the Judiciary
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
18. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81 with U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2.

19. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81.
20. See id. § 13, 1 Sta. at 80.
21. Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 81. Trial by jury of factual issues was provided for in the
district and circuit courts in all except admiralty, maritime, and equity cases. See id. §§
9(d), 12, 1 Stat. at 77, 80.
22. See id. §22, 1 Stat. at 84.
23. See id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-86.
24. See generally FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL

COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 4 (1990) (offering a comprehensive review of state of the
Judiciary and proposals to "prevent the system from being overwhelmed by a rapidly
growing and already enormous caseload"); Miner, supra note 4 (reviewing the Study
Committee Report, evaluating its recommendations, describing how the Second Circuit
currently handles the problems identified in the report, and offering further suggestions);
Roger J. Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptionsfor Relief,
51 ALB. L. REV. 151 (1987) (discussing the difficulty of having parallel state and federal
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structure are worthy of examination. Also of interest to those who would
prepare for the future of the federal courts is the original treatment of
subject matter jurisdiction, including diversity jurisdiction.' 5 It should be
remembered that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not vest in the federal
courts the full judicial power provided by the Constitution, probably
because the Federalists in control of Congress sought to appease the AntiFederalists.' Indeed, Congress never has conferred upon the courts the
full constitutional judicial power it has been authorized to confer.'
Should it do so now, in response to popular demand? Or should it cut
back? Should the status quo be maintained? The answers to these
questions, and others, can be gathered by studying the original Judiciary

Act. One thing is certain: the ever-expanding menu provided in the lower
federal courts,' a consequence of the "underdeveloped capacity [of
Congress] for self-restraint"' is beginning to create a caseload crisis of
major proportions.'
Twentieth-century scholars, lawyers, and judges have had occasion to

refer to section 34 of the original Judiciary Act and, apparently, will have
reason to do so again. In section 34, Congress went beyond the structural,
jurisdictional, and procedural aspects of the newly created judicial system
judicial systems with sometimes overlapping jurisdiction and suggesting methods for
alleviating friction between the two systems).
25. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. Much has been written about the
potential abolition of diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., M. CALDWELL BUTLER & JOHN P.
FRANK, ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME? (Nat'l
Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest Judicial Series, 1983) (presenting arguments both in support
of and against alteration of diversity jurisdiction); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., supra
note 24, at 38-42 (recommending either abolishing diversity jurisdiction or limiting its
availability, to case the federal caseload); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 566-69 (2d ed. 1989) (noting various reasons for federal
diversity jurisdiction and discussing alternatives thereto); Victor E. Flango & Craig
Boersema, Changes in FederalDiversity Jurisdiction:Effects on State Court Caseloads, 15
U. DAYTON L. REV. 405 (1990) (discussing the effect on state courts of elimination or
restriction of federal diversity jurisdiction).
26. RITZ, supra note 2, at 5.
27. BATOR ET AL., supra note 4, at 37; WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 4.
28. See generallyJEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICEIN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 167
(1987) (discussing historical landmarks in the expansion of federal jurisdiction).
29. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. See generally Miner, supra note 4, at 676-724 (noting the burgeoning federal
caseload and discussing possible solutions); Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal
Ckires, and Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117 (1987) (suggesting that the
"federalization" of criminal law has contributed to the overburdening of federal courts).
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and ventured into the area of the law to be applied by the federal courts.
Section 34, which has survived in the statutes essentially in its original
form, provided "[that the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or-statutes of the United States shall otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." 3" It has
been said that "[p]robably no statute regarding the federal courts has led
to such difficulty" as this one. 32
According to present conventional wisdom, section 34 requires that
state law, whether statutory or common, must be applied except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution, acts of Congress or treaties duly
ratified. This notion of course gained currency when Swift v. yson,"
interpreting "laws" in the context of section 34 as statutory only,' was
overruled by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.35 On behalf of the Erie
majority, Justice Brandeis wrote that "whether the law of the State shall
be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern."' The Brandeis opinion was
based in part on what the Justice referred to as "recent research of a
competent scholar. "' The scholar was Professor Charles Warren, who
had found in the attic of the Senate what appeared to be the original
manuscript draft of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In the draft that Professor
Warren found, there was a provision that would have established as rules
of decision at common law in courts of the United States, "the Statute law
of the several States in force for the time being and their unwritten or
common law now in use, whether by adoption from the common law of
England, the ancient statutes of the same or otherwise" except when the
Federal Constitution, federal statutes or treaties applied.3" Professor
Warren thought that the final version of section 34 was intended to say the
31. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92. The comparable provision today reads:
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
32. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 5.
33. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
34. See'id. at 17-18.
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
36. Id. at 78.
37. Id. at 72. But cf. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION: TENSIONS INTHE
ALOCATION OF JUDICiAL POwER 211 n.4 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that Justice Brandeis did
not exclusively rely on Professor Warren's work).
38. Rrrz, supra note 2, at 132 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34 (original
manuscript draft)).
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same thing as the newly discovered draft. 9 He believed that section 34
was grounded in federalism concerns.'
In their fascinating examination of the First Judiciary Act, the author
and editors of Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789 put an
entirely new spin on section 34. They say that it is not about federalism
at all, admonishing the reader that "one ought not read Section 34 as
doing what to moderns it seems perfectly obvious that it does and should
do, that is, to instruct national judges to look at state statutes and state
decisions and follow their lead." 4 They note that at the time the
Judiciary Act was adopted there were no common law decisions in print
and the state statutes generally were not collected and printed.42 It
therefore would make no sense for section 34 to refer to these as sources
of law.' Moreover, they make a persuasive argument that the manuscript
discovered by Professor Warren was not the same version of the bill that
the Senate used during its deliberations.' The Warren view is said to be
flawed by reliance on the manuscript."
Through scholarly deduction, examination of ancient documents, legal
reasoning, attention to the language then in use, and an astute
understanding of the tenor of the times, the distinguished legal historians
who wrote this book have posited two alternative conclusions about section
34: that it was intended as a direction to the new courts to apply American
rather than British law in all common law civil and criminal
proceedings;' or "most probably [that it] was intended as a temporary
measure to provide an applicable American law for national criminal
prosecutions, should national criminal prosecutions be brought in the
national courts, pending the time that Congress would provide by statute
for the definition and punishment of national crimes. "I They are certain
that section 34 was not intended to apply to diversity cases and that "on
its historical basis, Erie is dead wrong.""
Rewriting the History makes a forceful argument for the proposition
that section 34 was designed to allow the national courts to apply
American, rather than British, criminal common law until a national
39. Id.
40. Id. at 25.
41. Id. at 10-11.
42. See id. at 10.

43. Id.
44. See id. at 126-40.
45. See id. at 137.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 148.
48. Id.
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criminal code could be adopted.49 In its first session, the first Congress
failed to pass a criminal bill, although it did define two crimes with
punishment, both contained in the Collection Act and relating to the
collection of duties, and one crime with no specified penal% contained in
the Coasting Act and relating to the registering of ships. The Crimes
Act of 1790,"' adopted in the second session of the first Congress, was
the earliest criminal code. It defined crimes and provided penalties for
four categories of prohibited activities within the exclusive criminal
jurisdiction of the United States: felonies committed on the high seas,
offenses directly affecting the operations of government, crimes committed
within federal enclaves, and interference with the functioning of federal
courts.52 The offenses sanctioned in the Crimes Act were either
mentioned specifically in the Constitution or established under the
authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause.'
At least between the first and second sessions of the first Congress,
then, there was no criminal code in effect. Even the Crimes Act of 1790
can hardly be characterized as a comprehensive criminal code. What
criminal law was to apply? It generally was assumed that some law of
crimes was to be applied, else why grant to the lower federal courts such
complete criminal jurisdiction? Even the Anti-Federalists arguing for a Bill
of Rights that included guarantees relating to the crimiral process
"premised their argument on the assumption that the national courts under
the Constitution did have a comprehensive criminal jurisdiction. "I
Another historical curiosity supporting this contention is that the first
federal judges, in giving their grand jury charges, seem to have accepted
the extension of criminal jurisdiction to nonstatutory crimes.55 Curious
also is the position of section 34 in the First Judiciary Act. It is the nextto-last section, just before the provision for United States Attorneys in
each district and for an Attorney General of the United States. Does this
position signify a catch-all provision? And what about the power conferred
upon the United States Attorneys to "prosecute in such district all
delinquents for crimes and offences"?' In light of all this, it is passing
49. See id. at 116.
50. Id. at 114-15.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
See id.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Rrrz, supra note 2, at 110.
See id. at 118-20.
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. at 92.
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strange that the Supreme Court in 1812 held that there was no common
law of crimes.'
Rewriting the History sheds much new light on many old notions. Its
success lies in compelling the reader to forebear from reading the First
Judiciary Act through the eyes of "moderns." The reader is thus
constrained to avoid the ruinous vision of conventional wisdom. For
example, it generally has been assumed that the national judicial system
was modeled on then-existing hierarchical systems of state judiciaries.
This was not so, as the author and editors of the book clearly demonstrate.
They show that the state systems were subsequently modeled on the one
established by the Judiciary Act of 1789.1' At the time the Act was
adopted, there was in most cases no distinction between trial and appellate
judges in the several states. What then existed was a corps of judges who
presided over trials in the field and at times assembled in the state capitals
to hear appeals." The same group of judges sat in different courts.
Often, there was no real distinction between trials and appeals, and review
often meant a retrial by a court having more judges than the original
"inferior" court."
Apparently, there were those who feared that the Article I provision
for "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact" in the Supreme Court
would require litigants to travel to the nation's capital for retrials." As
Ritz, Holt, and LaRue put it: "The opponents of the Constitution, and
even some of its friends, were alarmed by this provision, since they read
it in the context of the then-existing state courts. "2 Also frightening to
some was the fact that the language of the Constitution seemed to dispense
with juries on retrial in the Supreme Court. It was to address those
concerns that Congress established the new three-tier system for the
national courts.' A jury was provided when the Supreme Court
exercised its original jurisdiction in cases brought against citizens of the
United States.' The appeals process was designed to work in a different
way from that extant at the time, because writs of error were provided to
bring up cases on appeal. The Supreme Court was limited to questions of
law when a lower court's decision was being reviewed; questions of fact
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
See RrIZ, supra note 2, at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81.
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could not be retried in those cases.' Policy reasons, rather than
tradition, informed the new hierarchical system and the procedures
prescribed for the national courts.'
This book, as promised, exposes myths, challenges premises, and uses
new evidence in its examination of the Judiciary Act of 1789. It does so
in an exciting way, holding the reader's interest from start to finish. The
background of the First Judiciary Act is presented in a most informative
manner. There are eight chapters in the book, each of which stands alone
as a matter of separate interest. The chapter headings are descriptive of
the material included in each: Introduction; Chronology and Description;
The "Judicial Systems" of the Several States in 1789; Organization of
National Courts Under the Judiciary Act of 1789; Word Usage in the
Constitution and in the Judiciary Act of 1789; Criminal Jurisdiction of the
National Courts; Section 34; and Epilogue: An Outline of the History and
Interpretation of Section 34. There are three appendices: Charles Warren
and the Judiciary Act of 1789; The Sources for a History of the Judiciary
Act of 1789; and Letters to and from Caleb Strong During May 1789. The
appendices are most valuable, as are the Notes, the Table of Short-Form
Citations, and the Index.
This is a book for all those who have an interest in the federal
judiciary-in its past, in its present, and in its future.

65. See id. § 22, 1Sta. at 84-85.
66. See RrTZ, supra note 2, at 5-7.

